Abstract-This paper systematically explores the efficiency of uncoordinated parking space allocation in urban environments with two types of parking facilities. Drivers decide whether to go for inexpensive but limited on-street parking spots or for expensive yet overdimensioned parking lots, incurring an additional cruising cost when they decide for on-street parking spots but fail to actually acquire one. Their decisions are made under perfect knowledge of the total parking supply and costs and different levels of information about the parking demand, i.e., complete/probabilistic information and uncertainty. We take a game-theoretic approach and analyze the parking-space allocation process in each case as resource selection game instances. We derive their equilibria, compute the related price-of-anarchy (PoA) values, and study the impact of pricing on them. It is shown that, under typical pricing policies on the two types of parking facilities, drivers tend to overcompete for the on-street parking space, giving rise to redundant cruising cost. However, this inefficiency can be alleviated through systematic manipulation of the information that is announced to the drivers. In particular, counterintuitive less-is-more effects emerge regarding the way that information availability modulates the resulting efficiency of the process, which underpin general competitive service provision settings.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE TREMENDOUS increase in urbanization necessitates an efficient and environmentally sustainable management of various urban processes and operations. Recent advances in wireless networking and sensing technologies can address this need by enabling efficient monitoring mechanisms and by providing higher control flexibility for these processes, thus paving the way for so-called smart cities. Intelligent network sensor nodes, which are placed on buildings' surfaces or mounted on vehicles, constitute pervasive monitoring platforms that can measure environmental parameters such as pollution concentration, radiation level, road traffic congestion, and public transport utilization. The data generated by this monitoring infrastructure can then be exploited by municipal authorities to more efficiently manage both the environmental and manmade city resources. In the case of parking space resources, in particular, the challenge is to efficiently manage the available parking space and to reduce the volume of vehicles cruising in search of parking space to alleviate not only traffic congestion but also the related environmental burden.
To this end, academic research and public and/or private initiatives in the past few years have been primarily directed toward the design and deployment of parking assistance systems. Common to these systems is the exploitation of wireless communications and sensing technologies to collect and broadcast (in centralized systems, see [1] and [2] ) or to share (in distributed systems, see [3] and [4] ) information about the supply of (and demand for) parking resources. This information ideally saves drivers from redundant cruising trips in search of a parking spot and assists in the management of parking resources, with centralized systems even implementing parking spot reservation. Parking assistance systems may also enable smart demand-responsive pricing schemes on the parking facilities, resulting in higher parking availability in overused parking zones and preventing double-parking and excessive cruising phenomena (i.e., in [5] ). This paper systematically explores the impact of the information these systems make available on the efficiency of the parking search process and resource utilization when the parking resource allocation is not controlled by a centralized entity, e.g., through a reservation mechanism. The drivers choose independently to either compete for the inexpensive but scarce on-street parking spots or head for the more expensive parking lot(s). In the first case, they run the risk of failing to get a spot and having to a posteriori take the more expensive alternative, suffering the additional cruising cost in terms of time and fuel consumption (and stress) of the failed attempt. Drivers make their decisions by drawing on various levels of information about the parking demand (number of drivers), and perfect knowledge of the parking supply (capacity) and the applied fees on the parking facilities. The questions that arise in this respect are as follows. How do different amounts of information on the parking demand modulate drivers' parking choices? Could this be controlled by the parking service operator to minimize the cost that drivers incur and the redundant cruising cost? How do prices charged for the two types of parking facilities modulate the information impact?
We take a game-theoretic approach and view the drivers as rational strategic selfish agents that try to minimize the cost that they pay for the acquired parking space. More precisely, we assume that the decisions are made by automatic software agent implementations on board the vehicles rather than by humans, and the drivers' actions fully comply with the agents' suggestions. We formulate the uncoordinated parking spot selection problem as an instance of resource selection games in Section II. The accuracy of the information that the drivers possess about the parking demand is abstracted at three levels, giving rise to an equal number of game variants. In Section III, we describe the game variant under complete information, which establishes a first comparison reference for the efficiency of the uncoordinated parking spot selection process. In Section IV, we analyze more realistic game variants, where decisions are made under probabilistic information and full uncertainty, respectively. We first derive the equilibria of the three game variants. Then, we quantify their efficiency through their price-of-anarchy (PoA) values with respect to an optimal centralized system implementing parking space reservation, and we explore how they (hence, the efficiency of the parking allocation process) depend on various factors.
The numerical results in Section V suggest that, for typical prices of the two types of parking resources, drivers tend to overcompete for the on-street parking spots, giving rise to redundant cruising cost. However, there are important degrees of freedom in alleviating this inefficiency. One possibility is through the choice of charging costs for the two facilities. The second possibility, which is much less intuitive, is through the systematic manipulation of information that becomes available to the drivers. In this respect, counterintuitive less-is-more effects emerge, implying that the possession of less accurate information on the parking demand alleviates competition and induces equilibrium behaviors that outperform those under complete knowledge. We outline related research and position this paper against it in Section VI, and we conclude in Section VII.
II. MODELING THE PARKING SPOT SELECTION PROCESS
In our model, drivers decides whether to compete for the low cost but scarce on-street parking space or to directly head for the overdimensioned but more expensive parking lots. Those who manage to park in the curbside pay c osp, s per-time cost units, whereas those heading directly for the safer parking lot option pay c pl = β · c osp, s , β > 1 units. However, drivers that decide first to search for low-cost parking spots but fail to acquire one and finally resort to a parking lot pay c osp, f = γ · c osp, s , γ > β units. The excess cost δ · c osp, s , δ = γ − β > 0, reflects the actual cost of cruising and the "virtual" cost of wasted time until eventually reaching the more expensive parking facility. Notice that the drivers' decisions are essentially made on the two sets of parking facilities, i.e., on-street parking space versus parking lots, rather than individual set items, i.e., parking spots.
Under an optimal centralized parking-spot-allocation scheme, with R on-street parking spots and N > R drivers, exactly R (N − R) drivers would be directed to the low-cost (respectively, more expensive) facilities, and no one would pay the excess cruising cost. In the absence of central coordination, each driver acts selfishly, aimed at minimizing the parking cost. However, the intuitive tendency to head for the low-cost on-street parking space, combined with its scarcity in urban center areas, give rise to the tragedy-of-commons effects and highlight the game-theoretic dynamics behind the parking spot selection task. Thus, the collective decision-making on parking space selection can be formulated as an instance of resource selection games, whereby N players (i.e., drivers/software agents) compete against each other for a finite number R of common resources (i.e., curbside parking) [6] . In this game-theoretic view of the parking spot selection process, the agents are assumed rational strategic players. They explicitly consider the presence of identical counteractors that also make rational decisions, weigh the costs related to every possible action profile, and act as cost minimizers. Thus, they may or may not hold precise information about the actual competition for parking resources.
In the following, we analyze the parking spot selection game under different levels of uncertainty (or amounts of information) for the overall parking demand, ranging from exact knowledge to, simply, an upper bound on the potential competitors. In all cases, we derive the stable operational conditions and the associated costs incurred by the players, and compare them with those under optimal centralized parking spot allocation.
III. PARKING SPOT SELECTION UNDER COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE OF PARKING DEMAND
In addition to the number of parking spots and the parking fees, which are assumed to be known throughout this paper, drivers are assumed to also possess perfect information about the level of parking demand, i.e., the number of drivers searching for parking space. Then, the one-shot parking spot selection game under complete information is defined as follows.
Definition III.1: A strategic parking spot selection game is a tuple Γ(N ) = (N , R, (A i ) i∈N , (w j ) j∈(osp, pl) ) with the following variables.
• N = {1, . . . , N}, N > 1 is the set of drivers who seek for parking space.
• R = R osp ∪ R pl is the set of parking spots; R osp is the set of on-street spots, with R = |R osp | ≥ 1; and R pl is the set of spots in parking lot, with |R pl | ≥ N .
• A i = {osp, pl} is the action set for each driver i ∈ N , comprising of the actions "on-street" (osp) and "parking lot" (pl).
• w osp (·) and w pl (·) are the cost functions of the two actions, respectively.
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The parking spot selection game falls under the broader family of congestion games. The players' payoffs (here, costs) are nondecreasing functions of the number of players competing for the parking capacity, rather than their identities, and are common to all players. More specifically, drivers who decide to compete for the curbside parking space undergo the risk of not being among the R winner drivers to get a spot. In this case, they have to eventually resort to a parking lot only after wasting extra time and fuel (plus patience supply) on the failed attempt. The expected cost for a driver that plays the action osp, w osp :
is therefore a function of the number of drivers k taking it and is given by
On the other hand, the cost for those that head directly to the parking lot facilities is fixed, i.e.,
We denote an action profile by the vector a = (a i , a −i ) ∈ × N k=1 A k , where a −i denotes the actions of all other drivers, except for player i in profile a. In addition to the two pure actions reflecting the pursuit of parking spots in curbside and in parking lots, the drivers may also randomize over them. In particular, if Δ(A i ) is the set of probability distributions over the action set of player i, a player's mixed action corresponds to vector p = (p osp , p pl ) ∈ Δ(A i ), where p osp and p pl are the probabilities of the two pure actions, with p osp + p pl = 1, whereas its cost is a weighted sum of the cost functions w osp (·) and w pl (·) of the pure actions. We draw on concepts in [7] and theoretical results in [6] and [8] to derive the equilibrium strategies for game Γ(N ) and assess their (in)efficiency.
A. Pure Equilibrium Strategies
Existence: The parking spot selection game constitutes a symmetric game, where the action set is common to all players and consists of two possible actions, i.e., osp and pl. 
where N osp (a) is the number of competing drivers for onstreet parking under action profile a. Equilibrium action profiles combine the players' best responses to their opponents' actions. Formally, an action profile a = (a i , a −i ) is a pure Nash equilibrium (NE) if, for all i ∈ N , it holds that
, so that no player has anything to gain by changing his decision unilaterally. Therefore, to derive the equilibrium states, we determine the conditions on N osp that break the equilibrium definition and reverse them. More specifically, given an action profile a with N osp (a) competing drivers, a player gains by changing his decision to play action a i in two circumstances, i.e.,
Lemma III.1: In Γ(N ), a driver is motivated to change his action a i in the following circumstances:
where
Proof: Conditions (6a) and (6c) are trivial. Since the current number of competing vehicles is less than the on-street parking capacity, every driver having originally chosen the parking lot option has the incentive to change his decision due to the price differential between c osp, s and c pl . When N osp (a) exceeds the curbside parking supply, a driver who has decided to avoid competition profits from switching his action when (4) holds, which when combined with (1) yields (6b). Similarly, a driver that first decides to compete profits by switching his action if (5) holds, which when combined with (1) yields (7).
Theorem III.1: The game Γ(N ) has the following. In [9] , we describe an alternative way to derive the equilibria of Γ(N ) via potential functions.
Efficiency: The efficiency of the equilibria is assessed through the broadly used metric of the PoA [7] . It expresses the ratio of the social cost in the worst-case equilibria over the optimal social cost under ideal coordination of the drivers' strategies.
Proposition III.1: In Γ(N ), the pure PoA equals
Proof: The social cost under action profile a equals hand, under the socially optimal action profile a opt , exactly R drivers pursue on-street parking space; hence, no drivers have to pay the additional cruising cost. The optimal social cost C opt is given by
Proposition III.2: In Γ(N ), the pure PoA is upper bounded by 1/(1 − R/N ) with N > R.
Proof: The condition is obtained directly from Proposition III.1, when N > R.
B. Mixed-Action Equilibrium Strategies
We consider symmetric mixed-action equilibria since these can be more helpful in dictating practical strategies in real systems. (Asymmetric mixed-action equilibria are discussed in [9] ).
Existence: In [6, Th. 1], it is proven that a unique symmetric mixed equilibrium exists for the broader family of resource selection games with more than two players and increasing cost functions. This is easily shown to hold for the game Γ(N ), with N > R and cost functions w osp (·) and w pl (·) that are nondecreasing functions of the number of players.
Derivation: The expected costs of choosing parking spots in the curbside and in the parking lot when all other drivers play the mixed action p = (p osp , p pl ) are given by c
where B(N osp ; N − 1, p osp ) is the binomial probability distribution with parameters N − 1 and p osp , for N osp drivers choosing curbside parking. The cost of the symmetric profile where everyone plays the mixed-action p is given by
We can now postulate the following Theorem, whose proof is given in [9] .
Theorem III.2: The game Γ(N ) has a unique symmetric mixed-action NE p NE = (p 
IV. PARKING SPOT SELECTION UNDER INCOMPLETE KNOWLEDGE OF PARKING DEMAND
The availability of complete information about the drivers' (i.e., players') population is a fairly strong and unrealistic assumption. Here, we relax it and study two game variants under incomplete demand information, where the players either share common probabilistic information about the overall demand or are totally uncertain about it. Note that the parking service operator, depending on the network and sensing infrastructure at his disposal, may provide the competing drivers with different amounts of information about the parking demand (e.g., based on historical statistical data). However, again, drivers are assumed to have perfect knowledge of the parking supply. This is fairly realistic and feasible since the sensing of the parking space and the broadcasting of the collected data can be viewed as less complex tasks.
A. Probabilistic Knowledge of Parking Demand
In the Bayesian model of the game, the drivers determine their actions based on private information, i.e., their types. The type in this game is a binary variable indicating whether a driver is in search of parking space (active player) or not. Every driver knows his own type along with the strategy space and the cost functions, and draws on common prior probabilistic information about the types of other drivers to estimate the expected cost of his actions. Formally, the Bayesian parking spot selection game is defined as follows.
Definition IV.1: A Bayesian parking spot selection game is a tuple
where N and R are as defined for Γ(N ), and
• A i = {osp, pl, } is the set of potential actions for each driver i ∈ N ; 
• p act is the probability for a driver to be active. In Γ B (N ), for all inactive drivers i, s i (ϑ i = 0) = . For active players i, s i (ϑ i = 1) ∈ {osp, pl}, under a pure-action strategy, or s i (ϑ i = 1) ∈ Δ({osp, pl}), when they randomize over this subset of A i under a mixed-action strategy. The game is symmetric when, in addition to the action set, drivers share the same activity probability p act and, hence, the same prior joint probability distribution of the drivers' activity (types) f Θ . The number of active players upon each time depends on their types and is given by n act = k ϑ k . The action profile is the effect of players' strategies on their types and is noted as posterior conditional probability of the active drivers given that user i is active, as derived from the application of the Bayesian rule. Therefore, s minimizes the expected cost over all possible combinations of the other drivers' types and strategies so that no active player can further lower its expected cost by unilaterally changing the strategy. • a unique pure (Bayesian Nash) equilibrium with p
• a unique symmetric mixed-action Bayesian NE with p
We present the proof in [9] .
B. Strictly Incomplete Information About Parking Demand
The worst-case scenario with respect to the information possessed by the drivers is represented by the pre-Bayesian game variant, under which the drivers are aware of only the upper limit of the vehicles that are potential competitors for parking resources.
Pre-Bayesian games do not necessarily have ex-post NEs, even in mixed actions. The ex-post NE consists of strategies that, for every joint type profile, result in actions that are in NE in the corresponding strategic game. On the other hand, all quasi-concave pre-Bayesian games do have at least one mixed-strategy safety-level equilibrium [6] . In the safety-level equilibrium, every player minimizes over his strategy set S i the worst-case (maximum) cost that he may suffer over all possible types and actions of his competitors (S −i , Θ −i ). The result of interest for our pre-Bayesian variant of the parking spot selection model Γ pB (N ) is the following proposition, due to [6] , whose implications for the efficiency of the equilibrium behaviors of the drivers are discussed in Section V.
Proposition IV.1: An action profile a is the unique symmetric mixed-action safety-level equilibrium of the pre-Bayesian parking spot selection game Γ pB (N ) with nondecreasing resource cost functions if and only if a is the unique symmetric mixed-action equilibrium of the respective strategic game with deterministic knowledge of the number of players Γ(N ).
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Here, we first systematically study the efficiency of the parking search process when the parking assistance systems provide information of perfect accuracy about the demand. Then, we comparatively discuss how this efficiency is affected when the process is executed under probabilistic information and uncertainty. For the numerical results, we adopt per-time unit normalized cost values used in typical municipal parking systems in big European cities [10] . The parking fee for onstreet space is set to c osp, s = 1 unit, whereas the cost of parking lot β ranges in (1, 16] units and the excess cruising cost parameter δ varies within [1, 5] units.
A. Parking Search Under Complete Information 1) Impact of Parking Demand and On-Street Parking Supply:
An optimal (centralized) mechanism would assign exactly min(N, R) on-street parking spots to min(N, R) drivers. If N ≤ R, in the absence of (central) coordination, all drivers go for the on-street parking space, and trivially, PoA = 1. Hereafter, we focus on the more interesting case N > R, where a number of drivers end up paying the extra cruising cost δc osp, s (see Lemma III.1 and Theorem III.1). Under a fixed pricing scheme, this inefficiency depends on N and R. In Fig. 1 , we plot the PoA against N and R ranging in [55, 195] and [10, 50], respectively. The following remarks suggest joint conditions on N and R that result in more efficient parking search.
Varying N or R: For N ≤ N 0 or, equivalently, for R ≥ Nδ/ (γ − 1), it holds that ϑPoA/ϑN > 0 and ϑPoA/ϑR < 0. Therefore, the PoA is strictly increasing in N and decreasing in R. On the contrary, for N > N 0 or R < Nδ/(γ − 1), the PoA is strictly decreasing in N and increasing in R, since ϑPoA/ϑN < 0 and ϑPoA/ϑR > 0.
When all drivers choose to compete, i.e., if N ≤ N 0 or R ≥ Nδ/(γ − 1), exactly R drivers pay c osp, s , whereas the rest of them, i.e., N − R drivers, pay γc osp, s . Thus, under a fixed pricing scheme, the social cost is optimized when the maximum charging cost (γc osp, s ) is incurred by the minimum possible set of drivers, namely, when the parking demand is the lowest possible one (N = R + 1) or, equivalently, as R is increased so that only one driver fails the competition for the lowcost parking spots. On the other hand, when N > N 0 or R < Nδ/(γ − 1), R drivers pay c osp, s , N − N 0 drivers pay βc osp, s , and N 0 − R drivers pay γc osp, s . Under the optimal operation of the service, the latter two sets of drivers directly head for a space in parking lot. Thus, the efficiency of the uncoordinated parking search is improved as the parking demand increases, making the total cost paid by the N − N 0 drivers the most critical factor for the overall social cost and hence minimizing the impact of the total cost paid by the N 0 − R drivers due to the lack of coordination. Equivalently, the set of N 0 − R = R(β − 1)/δ drivers that fail the competition is minimized when the on-street parking capacity becomes the lowest possible one, i.e., R = 1. On the other hand, the extra cruising cost δ may change as the result of, for example, an addition of a parking lot closer to the search area or a change in driving conditions. For given charging costs and on-street parking capacity, the construction of expensive parking lots in the proximity of the on-street parking area does not work effectively, when the competition is high (see Fig. 2 (a) and (b) for high N values and Fig. 2(c) and (d) for low R values). Otherwise, under medium or low competition, there is a monotonic trend that suggests, if possible, to decrease the distance between the two options to increase the efficiency of the parking search process. Overall, changes in this distance and, hence, the cruising cost are meaningless for high δ values, over R(β − 1)/(N − R). In this case, when N > N 0 , N 0 − R = R(β − 1)/δ drivers pay the extra cruising cost and end up in a parking lot together with the N − N 0 drivers that head directly for this kind of parking space. Thus, the increase of cruising cost has a doubleedge effect. On the one hand, drivers are discouraged from competing so that fewer end up paying the cruising overhead. On the other hand, failing the competition for on-street parking costs more. In addition, the total number of drivers that incur the more (less) expensive parking fee is N − R (R), irrespective of the exact δ value. As a result, changes in δ do not affect either the total cost spent for space in the on-street or parking lot facilities, or the aggregate cruising overhead. Thus, the social cost can be decreased by locating a parking lot in the proximity of the on-street parking area so that the additional travel distance is reduced to the point of bringing the excess cost δ below R(β − 1)/(N − R).
Although low PoA values denote high efficiency in the parking search process, they are not always coupled with low absolute social costs. For instance, this may happen under very intense competition, namely, under a high parking demand for very low curbside capacity (see Fig. 1 at N = 195, R = 10) . In the following, we study the sensitivity of the social cost to the parking demand and supply, and the prices charged for the two types of parking facilities. 2) Impact of the Pricing Scheme: Fig. 3 plots the social costs C(N osp ) under pure action strategies [see (8) and (9)] and C(p osp ) under mixed-action strategies as a function of the number of competing drivers N osp and competition probability p osp , respectively, where Fig. 3 motivates two remarks. First, the social cost curves for pure-and mixed-action profiles have the same shape. This comes as no surprise since, for given N , any value for the expected number of competing players 0 ≤ N osp ≤ N can be realized through an appropriate choice of the symmetric mixed-action profile p. Second, the cost is minimized when the number of competing drivers is equal to the number of on-street parking spots. The cost rises when either the competition exceeds the available on-street parking capacity or the drivers are overconservative in (and refrain more than they should from) competing for on-street parking. In both cases, the drivers pay the penalty for the lack of coordination in their decisions. The deviation from the optimal case grows faster with increasing price differential between the on-street spots and the space in the parking lot (i.e., β) or the distance between the on-street and parking lot facilities (i.e., δ).
If N > R, in the worst-case equilibrium (i.e., the equilibrium state with the maximum number of competing drivers and, hence, the maximum social cost among all equilibria), the number of drivers that actually compete for on-street parking spots exceeds the real curbside parking capacity by a factor that is a function of β and γ (equivalently, δ) (see Lemma III.1 and Theorem III.1). This inefficiency is captured in the PoA plots in Fig. 4(a) and (b) for β and δ ranging in [1.1, 16 ] and [1, 5] , respectively. The plots illustrate the following trends.
Varying β: For N ≤ N 0 or, equivalently, for β ≥ (δ(N − R) + R)/R, it holds that ϑ PoA/ϑβ < 0; therefore, the PoA is strictly decreasing in β. On the contrary, for β < (δ(N − R) + R)/R, the PoA is strictly increasing in β since ϑPoA/ϑβ > 0.
Practically, the equilibrium strategy emerging from this kind of assisted parking search behavior can approximate the optimal coordinated mechanism, provided that the operation of parking lots properly accounts for the drivers' preferences and estimates of the typical parking demand and supply. More specifically, if, as part of the pricing policy, the fee of parking lot is less than (δ(N − R) + R)/R times the cost of on-street parking, then the social cost in the equilibrium profile approximates the optimal social cost as the price differential between on-street parking and parking lots decreases. This result is in line with the statement in [11] , arguing that "price differentials between on-street and off-street parking should be reduced in order to reduce traffic congestion."
Note that the PoA metric also monotonically decreases for high values of the parking lot fee, specifically when the parking operator desires to gain more than (δ(N − R) + R)/R times the cost of on-street parking, toward a bound that depends on the excess cost δ. Nevertheless, these operating points correspond to high absolute social cost, i.e., the minimum achievable social cost is already unfavorable due to the high fee paid by the N − R drivers that use space in parking lots (see Fig. 3 , large β). However, there are instances, as in the case of R = 50 [see Fig. 4(c) ], where the value (δ(N − R) + R)/R corresponds to a nonrealistic (too large) option for the cost of the space in parking lots, already for δ > 1. Thus, in contrast with the previous case, the PoA only improves as the cost for parking lot decreases.
B. Parking Search Under Incomplete Information
Looking at the mixed-action equilibria, Theorem III.2 indicates that drivers' intention to compete for on-street parking resources is shaped by the pricing schemes, the number of players, and the curbside parking capacity. Indeed, players start to withdraw from competition as competition intensity rises over the threshold N 0 = R(γ − 1)/δ. For the Bayesian implementation, the rationale behind the active players' behavior is almost the same. The only difference is that the players adjust their strategies based on estimations for the demand level, as expressed in the commonly known probabilistic information of competition. Therefore, the probability to compete decreases with the expected number of competitors Np act if this number exceeds the threshold N 0 of the strategic games (see Theorem IV.1). Furthermore, for both game formulations, players start to renege from competition as the distance between onstreet and parking lot facilities (i.e., δ) is increased, the number of opportunities for curbside parking (i.e., R) decreases, or the price for space reservation in parking lot (i.e., β) drops. Fig. 5 shows the effect of these parameters on the equilibrium mixed action, for strategic (p act = 1) and Bayesian (p act ∈ {0.5, 0.7}) games.
Less Is More Phenomena Under Uncertainty: Less intuitive are the game dynamics in its pre-Bayesian variant, when users only possess an estimate of the maximum number of drivers that are potentially interested in parking space. From Proposition IV.1, the mixed-action safety-level equilibrium corresponds to the mixed-action equilibrium of the strategic game Γ(N ). However, we have seen that, when the players outnumber the on-street parking capacity, the mixed-action equilibrium in the strategic game generates a higher expected number of competitors than the optimal value R (see Theorem III.2), the social cost conditionally increases with the probability of competing (see Fig. 3(b) , for p osp > R/N), and the probability of competition decreases with N (see Fig. 5, for N > N 0 ) . Therefore, at the safety-level equilibrium of the game, the drivers end up randomizing the pure action "on street" with a lower probability than that corresponding to the game that they actually play, with k ≤ N players. Hence, the resulting number of competing vehicles is smaller, and cumulatively, they may end up paying less than they would if they knew deterministically the competition they face.
One question that becomes relevant is for which (real) number K of competing players do the drivers end up paying the optimal cost. Practically, if p 
That is, when (δ/(γ − 1))N (rounded to the nearest integer) drivers are seeking parking space under uncertainty conditions, in the induced equilibrium, they end up paying the minimum possible cost, which is better than what they would pay under complete information about the parking demand.
VI. RELATED WORK
Most work on parking assistance systems initially focused on centralized parking (reservation) mechanisms [1] , [2] , [5] , [12] . (For a comparative description of these systems and a broader summary of the work on the parking problem, see [9] ). Work on opportunistic parking search assistance, on the other hand, is rarer and more recent. In [3] , vehicles are allowed to exchange aggregate availability information of variable accuracy about clusters of parking places covering large regions, in an effort to limit the volume of the disseminated information for the sake of scalability. The way the opportunistic exchange of information among vehicles may sharpen competition for parking space is treated in [13] and [4] . In [13] , Kokolaki et al. show that the full exchange of information may give rise to synchronization effects (vehicles are steered toward similar locations), sharpen competition, and eventually render the search process inefficient. Motivated by similar findings, Delot et al. propose in [4] a distributed virtual parking space reservation mechanism, whereby vehicles vacating a parking spot selectively distribute this information to their proximity. Hence, they mitigate competition by controlling the diffusion of the parking information. Interestingly, the systems in [14] and [15] realize almost the same idea for parking management in the cities of Athens, Greece and New York, NY, USA, respectively. Both applications leverage the social network element. Users can offer their parking spot to the rest of the users or find a parking spot for themselves by claiming a spot that another user is offering.
Pricing and the more general economic dimensions of the parking allocation problem are analyzed from a microeconomical point of view in [16] . Anderson and de Palma view the parking spots as a common property resource and question whether free access or some pricing structure results in a more efficient use of the parking capacity. Subsequent research contributions have explicitly catered to strategic behavior and the related game-theoretic dimensions of general parking applications. In [17] , the games are played among parking facility providers and concern the location and capacity of their parking facility and which pricing structure to adopt. Whereas, in [18] and [19] the strategic players are the drivers. In [18] , which seeks to provide cues for optimal parking lot size dimensioning, the drivers decide on the arriving time at the lot, accounting for their preferred time and their desire to secure a space. In a work more relevant to ours, Ayala et al. in [19] define a game setting where drivers exploit (or not) information on the location of others to occupy an available parking spot at the minimum possible traveled distance, irrespective of the distance between the spot and driver's actual travel destination. The authors present distributed parking spot assignment algorithms to realize or approximate the NE states. This paper also draws on game-theoretic analysis. Similar to [18] and [19] , the decision-maker (player) is the driver, and as in [4] and [13] , we are particularly concerned with a broader phenomenon that is evidenced in several instances of information provision within noncooperative environments: the double-edged impact of information dissemination on the overall process efficiency, i.e., its assistance with resource/service discovery against the sharpening of competition for its usage. On the other hand, contrary to [16] , [18] , and [19] , we explicitly discriminate between on-street parking spots and parking lots as two types of resource choices by drivers. We argue that this dilemma between searching for cheaper yet nonguaranteed on-street parking space and heading directly for the granted yet costlier parking lot(s) is a frequently recurring situation in real urban everyday life, and we set our focus on the impact of information availability and accuracy on the efficiency of these decisions. Moreover, rather than considering a particular system or algorithm, as done in [1] - [5] , [12] , [14] , and [15] , we leverage game-theoretic abstractions to capture the different levels of information accuracy. In this way, we can derive closed-form expressions for the stable operational points in the different settings and insightful counterintuitive results about the impact of information on the efficiency of the parking search process.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have formulated the information-assisted parking search process as an instance of resource selection games with three game variants (strategic, Bayesian, and preBayesian), providing normative prescriptions for the impact of the information factor on drivers' decisions. Essentially, this paper has derived some bounds on what may be achievable by fully rational strategic agents that aim at minimizing the cost of their decisions. Our results describe how different amounts of information for the parking demand steer the equilibrium strategies, reduce the inefficiency of the parking search process, and favor the social welfare. The dissemination of parking information constitutes an instance of service provision within competitive networking environments, where more information does not necessarily improve the efficiency of service delivery but, even worse, may hamstring users' efforts to maximize their benefit. This result has direct practical implications since it challenges the need for more elaborate information mechanisms and promotes certain policies for information dissemination on the service provider side.
Here, we iterate on two implicit assumptions behind the game models that we introduced in Sections III and IV, which can motivate further research work.
Drivers' indifference among individual parking spots. The formulation of the parking spot selection game assumes that drivers do not have any preference order over the R onstreet parking spots. This could be the case when these R spots are quite close to each other, resulting in practically similar driving times to them and walking times from them to the drivers' ultimate destinations. When drivers express preferences over different parking spots, we come up with an instance of the stable marriage problem, potentially with indifference [20] , whereby the option of a parking lot would commonly rank as the last one for all drivers. At a theoretical level, the search is for mechanisms that treat all drivers fairly, are strategy proof, and efficient in some Pareto-optimality sense.
Drivers' rationality. Full (or global) rationality demands an exhaustive analysis of the possible strategies available to decision-makers and realization of the best-response actions. This may be feasible when decisions are made by wellprogrammed automated software agents on board the vehicles. However, when humans are actively involved in the decisionmaking process, the assumption of full rationality becomes much more problematic. Indeed, Simon in [21] , challenged both the normative and descriptive capacity of the fully rational decision-maker, arguing that human decisions are most often made under knowledge, time, and computational constraints. One way to accommodate the first constraints is through (pre-)Bayesian games of incomplete information, whereas the latter constraints are well expressed in alternative solution concepts to the NE [22] , [23] , arguing that individuals are more likely to select better choices than worse choices but do not necessarily succeed in selecting the very best choice. However, models that completely depart from the utility-maximization norm and draw on fairly simple cognitive heuristics, reflect better Simon's argument that humans are satisficers rather than maximizers. For example, the authors in [24] explore the impact of the fixed-distance heuristic on a simpler version of the unassisted parking search problem. The comparison of normative and more descriptive decision-making modeling approaches, both in the context of the parking spot selection problem and more general decision-making contexts, is an interesting area worthy of further exploration.
